















Department of Law 
In the Aftermath of the Crisis: The EU Administrative 
System between Impediments and Momentum  
































European University Institute 




IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS: THE EU ADMINISTRATIVE 
SYSTEM BETWEEN IMPEDIMENTS AND MOMENTUM 
Edoardo Chiti 
 




This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 




© Edoardo Chiti, 2015 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law 
This paper was first delivered at a conference held at the European University Institute in October 
2014 presenting some initial results of the project on Constitutional Change through Euro Crisis Law. 
This project is a study of the impact of Euro Crisis Law (by which is meant the legal instruments 
adopted at European or international level in reaction to the Eurozone crisis) on the national legal and 
constitutional structures of the 28 Member States of the European Union with the aim of investigating 
the impact of Euro Crisis law on the constitutional balance of powers and the protection of 
fundamental and social rights at national level. An open-access research tool (eurocrisislaw.eui.eu) has 
been created, based on a set of reports for each Member State, that constitutes an excellent resource 
for further, especially comparative, studies of the legal status and implementation of Euro Crisis law at 
national level, the interactions between national legal systems and Euro Crisis law and the 
constitutional challenges that have been faced. The project is based at the EUI Law Department and is 
funded by the EUI Research Council (2013-2015). 
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The European responses to the financial and public debt crisis have triggered a process of 
administrative reorganization and growth within two fundamental sectors of the EU, the internal 
market of financial services and the EMU. This paper argues that the process of reorganization and 
growth of the EU administrative machinery within the single financial market and the EMU is 
characterized by a number of inherent tensions. Four of them are prominent and refer, respectively, to 
the powers conferred to the satellite administrative bodies established in order to tackle the crisis, to 
the jurisdictions of the new administrations, to the degree of centralization which is sought within the 
new mechanisms for the implementation of EU laws and policies, to the accountability mechanisms. 
When assessed in the light of their capability to improve the EU administrative capacities, such 
tensions appear to be deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, they might operate as «fault lines» of the 
whole EU administrative machinery, destabilizing its functioning in two important fields of EU action. 
On the other hand, by pointing to a host of unsolved issues in EU administrative law, they provide an 
opportunity for opening a genuine institutional and scientific discussion on the ways in which the EU 
administrative system should be adjusted or reformed.  
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A Process of Reorganization and Growth 
The European responses to the financial and public debt crisis have not only set in motion a number of 
processes which are reshaping certain fundamental features of the Member States and European Union 
(EU) polities
1
. They have also determined a remarkable transformation of the EU administrative 
system, here meant as the whole of EU, national and mixed structures and processes functionally 
oriented to implement EU laws and policies
2
. Indeed, the EU and its political actors have rapidly 
identified in the EU administrative machinery an instrument of integration - or at least an instrument to 
avoid disintegration. In the last six years, within the internal market of financial services and the 
economic and monetary union (EMU), they have created new administrative bodies, delegated new 
and more incisive powers to EU administrations and expanded the scope of action of EU 
administrations. In brief, the attempts to tackle the crisis have triggered a process of administrative 
reorganization and growth within two crucial sectors of the EU.  
This is a largely unnoticed development, which the European legal scholarship has been so far 
reluctant to recognize and investigate. Yet, it raises some important questions on the evolution of the 
overall EU administrative system. What is the inner dynamic of the ongoing process of administrative 
transformation? In what direction is such a sectoral process driving the EU administrative machinery 
and its law? And how can we assess the current developments? 
This essay argues that the process of reorganization and growth of the EU administrative machinery 
within the single financial market and the EMU is characterized by a number of inherent tensions. 
When assessed in the light of their capability to improve the EU administrative capacities, which was 
the objective sought by the EU actors, such tensions appear to be deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, 
they might operate as «fault lines» of the whole EU administrative machinery, destabilizing its 
functioning in two important fields of EU action. On the other hand, by pointing to a host of unsolved 
issues in EU administrative law, they provide an opportunity for opening a genuine institutional and 
scientific discussion on the ways in which the EU administrative system should be adjusted or 
reformed. The reality of administrative change, thus, is more nuanced than it is assumed by the EU 
actors. 
The following pages will discuss four main tensions inherent to the process of transformation of the 
EU administrative machinery within the internal market of financial services and the EMU. Such 
tensions refer, respectively, to the powers conferred to the satellite administrative bodies established in 
order to tackle the crisis (§ 2), to the jurisdictions of the new administrations (§ 3), to the degree of 
centralization which is sought within the new mechanisms for the implementation of EU laws and 
policies (section 4), to the accountability mechanisms (§ 5). It goes without saying that further 
tensions might be identified and could provide a more precise account of the overall dynamic of the 
ongoing process of administrative reorganization and growth within the single financial market and 
the EMU. Yet, the four tensions that will be pointed to in the next sections are capable of shedding 
                                                     
1 On the many facets of the impact of the European responses to the Eurozone crisis on the constitutional structures of the EU 
Member States see, in particular, the papers presented at the workshop Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law, 
17-18 October 2014, European University Institute. The implications of the European responses both to the financial and 
public debt crisis on the EU constitutional structures are explored by Edoardo Chiti and Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, ‘The 
Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis’ (2013) 50 Common 
Market Law Review 683; Matthias Ruffert, ‘The European debt crisis and European Union law’ (2011) 48 Common 
Market Law Review 1777; Mark Dawson and Floris de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis’ 
(2013) 76 The Modern Law Review 817; Paul Craig, ‘Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional 
Architecture and Constitutional Implications’, in Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche (Eds.), The 
Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford: Hart, 2014) 19. 
2 For an explanation of this understanding of the EU administrative system, see Edoardo Chiti, ‘La costruzione del sistema 
amministrativo europeo’, in Mario Pilade Chiti (Ed.), Il diritto amministrativo europeo (Milano: Giuffrè, 2013) 45. 
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light on the challenges that the EU administrative system is currently facing. The final paragraph will 
present some general conclusions (§ 6). 
Powers 
When considering the administrative arrangements laid down in the aftermath of the crisis, there is no 
escaping the overall impression that the EU is gradually reinforcing the regulatory and adjudicatory 
powers of its satellite administrations. New administrative bodies have been established beyond the 
Commission, different from the models that have so far prevailed in the EU administrative system, and 
more powerful than the previous ones. Most importantly, the various measures adopted by the EU 
assume that the new bodies are not only responsible for the rational implementation of well designed 
EU law and policies, but are also engaged in the political process of adjusting an increasingly greater 
range of conflicting claims - that they make, in a word, political choices. At the same time, however, 
the discretionary nature of the action carried out by the new EU administrations is not openly 
recognized, but somehow hidden or camouflaged, as a consequence of a restrictive interpretation of 
the constitutional framework governing the adoption of EU administrative measures. Moreover, the 
complex chains of administrative powers envisaged by the EU do not put the new administrations in 
the position to exercise their new functions effectively.  
The result is a tension between two opposite forces, one driving towards the reinforcement of the 
powers of EU satellite administrations and the clarification of their discretionary nature, the other 
obstructing the effective exercise of these powers and presenting them as purely technical. Such 
tension gives rise to a number of legal and operational issues, which make the functioning of the new 
institutional arrangements relatively unstable. At a more general level, it encapsulates and promotes 
the idea that administrative change can be sought without taking clear-cut choices among various 
possible political and legal options. Comparative investigation of administrative law suggests that this 
approach is not likely to support the evolution and maturation of the EU administrative system. 
Historically, the articulation of the political and legal preferences involved, their open discussion and 
the choice among different options have been crucial factors of development for most western 
administrative systems
3
. There is no reason to consider that this should not apply to the EU 
administrative system, which is still in the process of defining its basic features, including the 
functional position of the Commission and its relationships with the other EU administrations. The 
tension inherent to the new administrative arrangements, however, might also prove a fruitful one, as it 
offers an opportunity to reflect on the possible ways forward and calls to make clear choices on the 
powers to be granted to EU satellite administrations.  
An example of the current situation is provided by the new arrangement for financial regulation. For 
the first time in the history of the internal market of financial services, the EU has expressly identified 
in administrative rule-making a fundamental instrument to establish a level playing field and an 
adequate protection of depositors, investors and consumers across the Union. While EU political 
institutions are responsible for the adoption of the so called «level 1» measures, the Commission, 
acting on the basis of drafts developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), is called to adopt regulatory technical standards and implementing technical 
standards
4
. Administrative rule-making, therefore, is placed at the heart of the overall regulatory effort 
                                                     
3 On the relevance of ideology in the development of administrative systems see in particular Jerry L. Mashaw, ‘Explaining 
administrative law: reflections on federal administrative law in nineteenth century America’, in Susan Rose-Ackerman 
and Peter L. Lindseth (Eds.), Comparative Administrative Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010) 37, 40 et seq. An application 
of this overall perspective can be found in Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution. The Lost One 
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012). 
4 More precisely, the three European supervisory authorities have the task of developing draft regulatory technical standards, 
implying neither strategic decisions nor policy choices, in the areas within the scope of the powers delegated to the 
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which is required to advance in the establishment of a single market of financial services. At the same 
time, though, administrative rule-making is called to operate within an imperfect regulatory chain. The 
distribution of tasks between the various rule-makers is based on an excessively rigid distinction 
between policy-making and technical decision-making, which is difficult to respect in regulatory 
practice, as well as on an unclear articulation of administrative rule-making in regulatory and 
implementing technical standards. In the exercise of their regulatory action, the administrative rule-
makers in the field of financial services, including the new European supervisory authorities (ESAs), 
meet a number of uneasy issues: is it really possible to distinguish in practice between policy-making 
and technical measures? How can the boundaries of technical decisions be identified? Is there a 
substantial difference between the available types of binding technical measures?  
The establishment of an imperfect regulatory chain should not be taken as a minor imperfection of the 
ESAs establishing regulations. It rather reflects a more profound problem of institutional design. The 
arrangement set up by the establishing regulations, indeed, does not lay down a clear and stable 
architecture of the institutional relations between the various rule-makers. Rather, it suffers from a 
fundamental tension between two different visions of the relations among the rule-makers in the field: 
one recognizing the potentialities of the ESAs as specialized regulators, the other minimizing their 
regulatory role. On the one hand, the ESAs represent, within the overall rationale of the regulations, 
the best equipped bodies to elaborate the specialized measures that are necessary to regulate the 
financial services area at the level of secondary measures
5
. In this sense, the new administrative 
regulatory powers represent a qualitative change not only in the administrative governance of the field 
of financial services, but also within the context of the wider EU administrative system, as European 
agencies and other satellite bodies have never before been put at heart of the regulatory process of any 
sector of EU action
6
. On the other hand, as a consequence of a restrictive interpretation of the existing 
constitutional framework governing the adoption of sub-legislative regulatory measures, the 
procedural framework laid down by the regulations provides the ESAs with a regulatory role which is 
too narrow to allow them to exploit their potentialities as specialized regulators. Their action is limited 
to the adoption of draft regulatory measures and confined within the strict boundaries of purely 
technical decision-making, excluding the exercise of any discretion. 
This fundamental tension is capable of conditioning the effective functioning of the single market of 
financial services. It excludes that it is possible to find within the context of the ESAs establishing 
regulations a set of operational solutions to the above mentioned questions concerning the interplay 
between level 1 and level 2 measures. It undermines the capacity of the various rule-makers to co-
operate effectively in the establishment of a European single rule book applicable to all financial 
institutions. It makes ESAs action potentially subject to contestation.  
It also provides, however, an opportunity to clarify the legal boundaries of the powers that the ESAs 
might be granted. This requires an open and fresh institutional discussion between the ESAs 
themselves, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. Such discussion should not be 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Commission under EU financial services law and in accordance with Article 290 TFEU. Moreover, they may develop 
draft implementing technical standards in the areas where financial services law provides the Commission with powers 
for issuing uniform conditions for the implementation of EU law in accordance with Article 291 TFEU. See Articles 10 
and 15 of the three establishing regulations (regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, all in OJ 2010 L 331). 
5 See, e.g., Recitals 21-23 of regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010, cit. 
6 Of course, one might refer to several EU sectors in which European agencies exercise de jure or de facto rule-making 
powers, both through participation in the adoption of binding implementing rules and regulation by soft law. The ESAs, 
though, may be said to represent a qualitative change with respect to that practice in so far as administrative rule-making 
is one of the fundamental instruments through which the EU aims at guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the single 
financial market and the ESAs are openly recognized by the establishing regulations as the specialized regulators in the 
field. For a bird’s-eye view of European agencies’ rule-making, see Edoardo Chiti, ‘European Agencies’ Rule-Making. 
Powers, Procedures and Assessment’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 93. 
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necessarily oriented towards the amendment of the establishing regulations, although such possibility 
should not be excluded as a taboo.  
As for the contents of the clarification sought, one could promote an interpretation of the establishing 
regulations which minimizes the regulatory role of the ESAs. From this perspective, the ESA’s 
regulatory tasks should be interpreted in such a way so as to be perfectly coherent with a radically 
restrictive reading of the constitutional framework for the adoption of sub-legislative regulatory 
measures. According to such a reading, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) require a direct and substantial action by the Commission. Moreover, the 
Meroni and Romano rulings exclude, respectively, that European agencies may adopt measures 
implying any kind of discretionary choice
7
 and may be granted rule-making powers
8. ESA’s 
regulatory powers should be kept within those boundaries. This orientation, though, is not acceptable, 
as neither of the two interpretations of the constitutional framework on which it is based is correct. 
The first is unnecessarily restrictive. As  happens with other equivalent Treaty provisions, such as 
Article 317 TFEU, the explicit reference to Commission’s responsibility in delegated and 
implementing measures made by Articles 290 and 291 does not at all mean centralized action. More 
simply, it establishes a «constitutional protection» of supranationalism in the administrative 
implementation process. While the Commission’s responsibility cannot be neutralized and has to be 
fully guaranteed, it can nevertheless be translated by the EU legislator in a variety of institutional 
arrangements, including arrangements exploiting the regulatory capacity of European agencies or 
other specialized administrations. As for the second reading, it is legally not sustainable to interpret 
Meroni in such a way to exclude that EU administrations different from the Commission can adopt 
measures implying a certain degree of discretion. This understanding of Meroni is contrary to the 
reality of the EU administrative system, which already relies on a great number of administrative 
bodies exercising different degrees of discretion, even when carrying out tasks that are apparently 
instrumental to the action of other national and EU public powers. It would also lead, if accepted, to 
the paradoxical conclusion that the EU cannot ensure the effectiveness of EU laws and policies by 
developing an administrative component of its executive power beyond the Commission and European 
Central Bank (ECB).  From a legal realist perspective, the Meroni doctrine should therefore be 
interpreted as requiring that European agencies and other EU specialized administrations may be 
granted powers implying a certain degree of discretion, and more precisely, a discretion framed by a 
previous EU legislative act in such a way so as to preclude an arbitrary exercise of power by the 
relevant EU body. One should also recall the recent ESMA case, in which the Court of Justice (ECJ) 
                                                     
7 Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority [1997-1958] ECR 133; see also case 10/56, Meroni v. High Authority [1957-1958] 
ECR 157. In the Meroni judgments, as it is well known, the European Court of Justice traced a clear-cut distinction 
between two different hypotheses: on the one side, the delegation of purely executive powers, compatible with the 
Treaty; on the other side, the delegation of a discretionary power, which is not legitimate under Community law. Such 
restriction is based on the principle of institutional balance, which Meroni has recognised for the first time in the 
Community legal order. After a 50 year long silence, the Court has confirmed the Meroni doctrine in several judgements: 
see joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Nutri-Link 
Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and The Queen, on the application of National Association of Health Stores and 
Health Food Manufacturers Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales [2005] ECR I-6451, § 
90; case C-301/02 P, Carmine Salvatore Tralli v European Central Bank [2005] ECR I-4071; and case C-270/12, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, nyr. See 
also joined cases T-369/94 and T-85/95, DIR International Film Srl, Nostradamus Enterprises Ltd, Union PN Srl, United 
International Pictures BV, United International Pictures AB, United International Pictures APS, United International 
Pictures A/S, United International Pictures EPE, United International Pictures OY and United International Pictures y 
Cía SRC v Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-357, §§ 52-53.  
8 Case 98/90, Romano [1981] ECR 1241, according to which the Treaty provisions on the implementation of EC law and on 
the system of judicial protection excludes that an administrative body may be «empowered by the Council to adopt acts 
having the force of law». Among the recent contributions on this case-law, see in particular Merijn Chamon, ‘EU 
Agencies Between Meroni and Romano or the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 
1055; and Stefan Griller and Andreas Orator, ‘Everything Under Control? The “Way Forward” for European Agencies in 
the Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 3. 
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has held that powers «precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the 
objectives established by the delegating authority» comply with the requirements laid down in 
Meroni
9
. In the same judgement, the ECJ has clarified that it cannot be inferred from Romano that the 




A different option is to exploit the ESA’s potentialities as specialized regulators in the field. This 
would be not only functionally justified, but also legally possible. Three main reasons allow, from a 
legal point of view, for a full exploitation of the ESA’s potential as regulators. Two of them have just 
been mentioned: the Commission’s responsibility in delegated and implementing measures envisaged 
by Articles 290 and 291 should not be meant as necessarily requiring centralized action; and Meroni 
cannot be interpreted in such a way so as to exclude that EU administrations different from the 
Commission can adopt measures implying a certain degree of discretion. The third reason is that the 
provision of a genuine regulatory role to the ESAs is inherent to the fundamental dynamics of the 
making of the single market in financial services. If the current phase of the making of the single 
financial market relies on a really effective single rulebook as a factor for further integration, and if the 
single rulebook requires key technical rules to be adopted through EU regulations, directly applicable 
in all 28 Member States and leaving no room to national choices, then the only way forward is to 
exploit the capacities of the ESAs as specialized regulators.  
How to interpret and adjust the current institutional arrangements in such a way so as to exploit the 
regulatory capacities of the ESA is a question escaping the ambitions of this paper. Yet, at least the 
following paths could be explored. To begin with, it would be appropriate to institutionalize some 
form of involvement of the ESAs in the discussions on level 1 regulation, at least in order to define the 
scope and contents of the ESAs mandates. In addition to this, a favour should be expressed for level 1 
measures limiting the elements of discretion for the national competent authorities to those cases 
where this discretion is really needed, and relying on the regulatory capacity of the ESAs to draft 
technical standards in the form of a directly applicable Regulation. Moreover, a restrictive 
interpretation of the powers of the Commission within the endorsement procedure should be 
promoted, which also implies self-restraint in the informal exchanges with the ESAs in the procedure 
leading to the elaboration of binding technical standards. Finally, one should also favour a balanced 
self-restraint by the European Parliament and the Council in the exercise of their power to object to 
regulatory technical standards. 
Jurisdictions 
In their attempts to tackle the crisis, the EU has established a vast array of EU administrative 
arrangements that are relevant for all Member States. This is the case, for example, for the ESAs, 
established by EU legislative acts and called to co-ordinate the national supervisors within a 
«European System of Financial Supervision». A further example is provided by the new 
administrative framework envisaged by the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) by the Six 
Pack, based upon the administrative supervision carried out by the Commission of the fiscal and 
budgetary policies of all Member States. In several other instances, though, the EU actors have opted 
for administrative arrangements that have a limited jurisdiction, as they apply only to some Member 
States. For example, 18 of the 28 EU Member States participate to the European Financial Stability 
                                                     
9 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, cit., § 41 ff., concerning the ESMA’s power to adopt emergency measures on the Member States’ 
financial markets in order to regulate or prohibit short selling. 
10 Ibidem, § 66. For a point of view different from that expressed in the text, substantially critical of the judgement and 
deploring the rejection of Romano’s relevance beyond that of Meroni, see Merijn Chamon, ‘The Empowerment of 
Agencies under the Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: Comment on United Kingdom v Parliament and Council 
(Short-selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism’ (2014) 39 European Law Review 380. 
Edoardo Chiti 
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Facility (EFSF) and to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), while 23 
Member States are subject to the administrative framework of the Euro Plus Pact, and 25 countries 
operate within the context of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU 
(TSCG). As these examples show, the administrative arrangements limited to certain Member States 
are sometimes established by legal sources that are not purely internal to the EU framework, but that 
combine EU law instruments with public international law instruments.  
The EU responses to the crisis thus encapsulate a tension between two diverging moves, one towards 
the refinement of the administrative capacities of the EU as a whole, the other towards the 
establishment of administrative arrangements that apply only to a limited number of Member States, 
mainly the Eurozone countries. The result is a variable geometry of administrative architecture. Not all 
EU Member States participate simultaneously in the various components of the administrative 
regulatory framework. A variety of administrative disciplines applicable to different groups of EU 
Member States are called to co-exist one next to the others. At the organizational level, moreover, the 
economic governance of the EU now relies on an arabesque of multiple administrative bodies, acting 
in different compositions and relevant to different groups of States. The main dividing line is that 
between administrative arrangements working for the EU as a whole and administrative arrangements 
working for the Eurozone countries only. 
This situation has partly negative and partly positive effects. On the one hand, the working capacity of 
the EU administrative system cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, several positive law issues stem 
from the difficulties to manage the co-existence of administrative disciplines applicable to different 
groups of EU countries. At a more profound level, the emerging variable geometry might determine a 
loss of coherence in the overall EU administrative action and jeopardize the unity of the EU 
administrative system. On the other hand, the current situation opens the way for a discussion on the 
European administrative system as a project of institutional design, and in particular on the ways in 
which unity and differentiation may be combined within it. 
One way to explore this tension is to refer to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM is a 
genuine novelty both at the constitutional and administrative level
11
. Its establishment is the most 
remarkable transfer of national competences to an EU institution after the explosion of the crisis. 
Moreover, it brings about an unprecedented centralization of banking supervision tasks, which are 
now entrusted to the ECB
12
. As for its jurisdiction, which is the point that is relevant here, the SSM 
has a peculiar and interesting architecture. It is designed as an administrative arrangement as 
compatible as possible with the EU administrative arrangements operating for the EU as a whole and 
potentially open to all Member States. But it operates primarily as an administrative mechanism 
internal to the Eurozone. 
The open character of the SSM is testified to by several aspects of the founding Regulation
13
. Article 
127/6 TFEU, which was used as a legal basis, requires that the decision to adopt a Council Regulation 
is taken by all Member States, including Denmark and the UK, and may be interpreted not only as a 
monetary policy provision, but also as a single market clause, as banking supervision refers to 
                                                     
11 See the thorough analysis by Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, ‘Europeanising prudential banking supervision. Legal foundations 
and implications for European integration’, in John Erik Fossum and Agustìn J. Menéndez (Eds.), The European Union 
in crises or the European Union as crises? (Arena Report Series, 2014) 527. 
12 See e.g. Marcello Clarich, ‘I poteri di vigilanza della Banca centrale europea’, in (2014) Astrid online, available at 
http://www.astrid-online.it/rassegna/14-03-2014/Clarich_Banking-Union--convegno-italo-spagnolo--10-3-2014.pdf (last 
visited 20 January 2015). 
13 Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ 2013 L 287. See also Regulation (EU) 
No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national 
designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17), OJ 2014 L 141. 
In The Aftermath of the Crisis: The EU Administrative System Between Impediments and Momentum 
 
7 
competences relating to the provision of financial services. Most importantly, the founding Regulation 
attempts in a variety of ways to guarantee that the SSM, as an administrative arrangement of the 
Eurozone, is capable of harmoniously fitting within the administrative framework of the EU as 
whole
14
. As for the relations between the SSM and the EBA, for example, the SSM Regulation, on the 
basis of the recognition that the EBA substantially represents the single market regulator, requires the 
ECB to comply with the EBA's guidelines and recommendations. In addition to this, the ECB 
jurisdiction may be extended through the instrument of «close cooperation». The Member States from 
outside the euro area may request to join the SSM. If a close cooperation is established between the 
ECB and the national supervisor of a Member State whose currency is not the euro, the banks in that 
Member State are made subject to the supervision of the ECB
15
. 
None of these elements, though, is capable of modifying the basic nature of the SSM as a Eurozone 
administrative instrument. Article 127(6) TFEU may be subject to wide interpretations, but it falls 
within the monetary policy chapter of the Treaty and is certainly internal to the regulatory framework 
of the single currency. The main supervisory tasks within the SSM have been conferred upon an EU 
institution, the ECB, whose jurisdiction is currently limited to the Member States within the euro area. 
Close cooperation undoubtedly allows for extension of the SSM’s jurisdiction beyond the Eurozone, 
but it does so through a legal arrangement which does not grant the Member States in close 
cooperation the same legal position as that of the Eurozone countries. For example, ‘close 
cooperation’ is not a permanent arrangement and it may be terminated by either the SSM or the 
Member State. 
The circumstance that the SSM is primarily destined to operate within the euro-area has at least one 
relevant implication. It accentuates the distinction between the euro countries and the other EU 
members. The Eurozone countries and the other EU members are becoming two increasingly distinct 
groups of States because they are subject to partly different sets of administrative rules and may rely, 
in certain sectors (the monetary union and the internal market for financial services), on different 
administrative capacities.  
This may be described as a process of internal differentiation of the European administrative system. 
As such, it is far from being a new development in EU administrative law. Internal differentiation has 
long been a distinguishing feature of the European administrative system. Yet, one should not miss the 
specific nature of the current evolutions. The process of internal differentiation of the European 
administrative system has traditionally concerned the techniques of administrative action available in 
the various fields of action (internal market, competition, social regulation, etc.). The establishment of 
the SSM and other administrative instruments internal to the Eurozone produces a different effect. 
What is currently taking place is not a process of differentiation of the administrative capacities 
available within different sectors, but a process of differentiation of the administrative capacities 
available to different groups of Member States within the same sectors. Indeed, the SSM operates 
across the single market of financial services and the monetary union, but it essentially applies to the 
euro-zone States. This is not, though, an entirely new phenomenon within the EU legal order. The 
European administrative system has already experienced forms of differentiation in relation to groups 
of States
16
. The monetary union itself has been designed since the beginning as a project inclusive and 
                                                     
14 Sabino Cassese, ‘La nuova architettura finanziaria europea’ (2014) 19 Giornale di diritto amministrativo 79, 81. 
15 For a short account of this mechanism, see Marcello Clarich, ‘Governance of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and non-
euro Member States’, in Emilio Barucci and Marcello Messori (Eds.), The European Banking Union (Firenze: Passigli, 
2014) 73. 
16 The continuity between the past practices of differentiated integration and the current developments within the Eurozone is 
highlighted by several authors: see., e.g., Jean-Claude Piris, It is Time for the Euro Area to Develop Further Closer 
Cooperation Among its Members (Jean Monnet Working Paper 05/11, NYU School of Law), online at 
www.JeanMonnetProgram.org, 24 et seq.; Brigid Laffan, ‘European Union and the Eurozone: How to Coexist?’, in 
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Saverio Simonelli (Eds.), Governance for the Eurozone. Integration or Disintegration? 
(Philadelphia: Fic Press) 173; J. Emmanouilidis, Which lessons to draw from the past and current differentiated 
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mandatory for all EU Member States, except for the United Kingdom and Denmark, but also as a 
multi-speed project, allowing a differentiation between euro countries and countries that have not yet 
adopted the euro as their currency
17
. 
What is important to notice, in any case, is that the emergence of forms of variable geometry within 
the European administrative system is a highly ambivalent process.  
The co-existence within the same sectors of EU administrative disciplines and organizations 
applicable to different groups of States is likely to raise uneasy legal issues in the near future. The 
interactions between the SSM and the EBA will offer an interesting case-study to test the actual 
capacity of the existing framework to prevent overlap and conflicts between two instruments operating 
for different groups of countries. Most importantly, the co-existence within the same sectors of 
administrative arrangements involving different groups of States may affect the overall structure of the 
European administrative system. Two dangers are prominent. First, the deepening of the 
administrative integration between the Eurozone countries might jeopardize the unity of the EU 
sectoral regimes, such as the regulatory framework of the single market. Through the administrative 
capacities offered to them by the EU, different groups of countries are likely to develop, within the 
single market or another EU sectoral regime, different administrative practices, techniques of action, 
regulatory strategies and accountability instruments. For example, until the European Single Rulebook 
in the single financial market is fully realized, the SSM is likely to lead to a substantial unification of 
banking law within its jurisdiction
18
. While the search for administrative uniformity is not justified per 
se, administrative differentiation becomes problematic when it is not justified on functional or 
normative grounds. Second, at a more general level, the European administrative system might lose 
the minimum degree of its internal coherence that is granted by the simultaneous participation of all 
Member States to the various EU administrations. This would not be a minor shortcoming, given the 
traditional difficulties of the EU «composite» executive power, made up of the Commission, the 




The emergence of forms of variable geometry within the European administrative system, however, 
might also have a positive effect. Indeed, the co-existence within the same sectors of administrative 
arrangements involving different groups of States offers the EU political institutions and legal scholars 
an interesting chance to reflect on the overall architecture of the European administrative system, and 
in particular on the appropriate balance between unity and differentiation within it. Is a minimum 
degree of unity necessary for the European administrative system to work effectively? How much 
differentiation may be admitted? In case a certain degree of unity is considered to be necessary, which 
(Contd.)                                                                  
integration?, paper presented at the workshop Challenges for multi-tier governance in the EU, European Parliament, 4 
October 2012, available at: 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201210/20121003ATT52863/20121003ATT52863EN.pdf (last 
visited 20 January 2015). 
17 See, for a short account of differentiation within the EMU, Thomas Beukers and Marijn van der Sluis, The Variable 
Geometry of the Euro-crisis, paper presented at the workshop on Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law, 17-18 
October 2014, European University Institute, § 2. 
18 Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, ‘Europeanising prudential banking supervision. Legal foundations and implications for European 
integration’, cit., 568. The risk of regulatory conflicts is highlighted by Gian Luigi Tosato, ‘The governance of the 
banking sector in the EU A dual system’, in Emilio Barucci and Marcello Messori (Eds.), The European  
Banking Union, cit. 
19 The characteristics of the European executive power are discussed in a vast literature. See in particular, Sabino Cassese, 
‘La Costituzione europea’ (1991) Quaderni costituzionali 487; Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of 
Powers in the European Communities’, (1991) 28 Common Market Law Review 11; Philippe Dann, ‘The Political 
Institutions, in Principles of European Constitutional Law’, in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (Eds.), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 229. The composite character of the EU executive power is specially 
stressed by Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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lessons can be drawn from a comparative assessment of the existing administrative arrangements? Are 
the Eurozone administrative arrangements more effective and qualitatively more advanced than those 
available to EU at large? Should they be extended to all Member States?  
These are, of course, issues of institutional design. They differ, in this regard, from the issues pointed 
out in the previous section. While those were positive law issues, concerning the legal possibility to 
provide EU satellite bodies with genuine regulatory powers, the issues at stake here relate to the 
structure and rationale of the European administrative system. In order to address them, it is necessary 
to reflect on the relationship between the European administrative system and the EU executive 
power, to consider paths so far overlooked in the construction of the European administrative system, 
such as the establishment of a transnational civil service, and to take into account the specific features 
of the EU as a polity still in the making, ambiguously combining federal, intergovernmental and 
governance elements. This paper cannot engage in such reflection. It aims, however, at bringing legal 
scholarship’s attention to a set of open issues of institutional design concerning the European 
administrative system, as well as at calling for a genuine discussion of the point.  
Centralization 
In organizing a stable response to the crisis, the EU has envisaged mechanisms for the implementation 
of EU law which heavily rely on the cooperation between national and EU administrations. This is 
fully in line with the developments of the last twenty-five years, in which the administrative 
implementation of EU law has become essentially a matter of joint action by national, supranational 
and mixed authorities, beyond the traditional dichotomy between centralized and decentralized 
administrative action
20
. More precisely, the implementing mechanisms set up by the EU in order to 
tackle the crisis are designed as top-down organizational arrangements, made up by national and 
composite administrations but functionally dominated by an EU body. This confirms the consolidated 
tendency to establish instruments of joint administrative implementation based on a great number of 
nuanced combinations of transnationalism and supranationalism
21
, the most complex of which is 
probably that of implementation through administrative networks coordinated by European agencies
22
.  
While falling within this consolidated tradition, the implementing mechanisms established in the 
aftermath of the crisis also present a peculiarity. What is new is the strengthened position of the EU 
bodies in charge of the co-ordination of the administrative networks. In their relations with the 
national components of the networks, the EU bodies may rely on powers more elaborated and incisive 
than those traditionally accorded to EU bodies within administrative composite systems. At the same 
time, however, the move towards more hierarchical and centralized arrangements is countered by the 
excessive complexity of the overall constructions or by the ambiguity of the solutions laid down by the 
EU legislator.  
                                                     
20 See, e.g., Edoardo Chiti and Claudio Franchini, L’integrazione amministrativa europea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003); 
Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Türk (Eds.), EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2006); Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Türk (Eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law. Towards an 
Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009); Jesús Á. Fuentetaja Pastor, La administración europea. La 
ejecución europea del derecho y las políticas de la Unión (Navarra: Civitas, 2007); Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, II ed., 2012) 79 et seq. 
21 For a tentative taxonomy of those instruments, see Edoardo Chiti, ‘The Administrative Implementation of European Union 
Law: A Taxonomy and Its Implications’, in Herwig C.H. Hoffmann and Alexander H. Türk (Eds.), Legal Challenges in 
EU Administrative Law. Towards an Integrated Administration, cit., 9. 
22 The literature on European agencies is too abundant to be usefully recalled here. In the perspective developed in this 
article, see Edoardo Chiti, ‘An important part of the EU's institutional machinery. Features, Problems and Perspectives of 
European Agencies’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1395.  
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Two forces are therefore at work, one driving towards further centralization, the other limiting the 
action of the functionally prominent EU body. Such tension produces several operational issues, which 
jeopardize the capacity of the new implementing mechanisms to ensure the full effectiveness of EU 
laws. The smooth functioning of the new top-down arrangements cannot be taken for granted. Yet, the 
existing tension also offers a chance to reflect on the legal possibility to reinforce centralization and 
hierarchy within the administrative networks. 
An example of the current situation is provided by the EBA role in the interpretation of the EU rules in 
the field of the internal market of financial services. 
In the overall construction laid down by the EU legislator, regulation in that field is conceived of as a 
process which cannot be confined to the creation of a European Single Rulebook made up of EU 
principles, rules and binding technical standards. A consistent interpretation and application by 
national authorities of the existing EU principles, rules and standards is crucial to establishing a high-
quality regulatory environment
23
. The EU legislator, in other words, recognizes the functional need to 
govern the processes of adjustment, reaction and neutralization of EU law by national authorities when 
interpreting and applying the European Single Rulebook.  
The response given to such need is to confer on the EBA of the task of managing and orienting the 
interpretation and application of the relevant EU law provisions by national authorities. This choice is 
justified by the nature of the EBA as an EU administration both highly specialized and internally 
designed in such a way as to give voice to the national competent authorities. Thus, the EBA does not 
only contribute to the creation of the European Single Rulebook by drafting the relevant binding 
technical standards. It is also called to guide the interpretation and application of EU law by national 
authorities. This combines to grant the EBA a position of functional prominence within the composite 
administration of financial services.  
Such functional prominence, however, is countered by the reluctance to provide the EBA with binding 
powers. The tools available for the EBA are non-binding regulatory measures, aimed at building 
compliance in a non-coercive way and relying on adaptation and gradual regulatory convergence. This 
is a consequence not only of a strict interpretation of the Meroni ruling, but also of the political will to 
safeguard the prerogatives of national authorities. As a result, the EBA is granted a «meta-regulatory» 
role, as it is called to orientate the interpretation and application of EU law by national authorities by 
means of soft law measures
24
. 
The tension between one force supporting centralization within the network and the other constraining 
the action of the EBA results in an ambiguous legislative framework raises a number of operational 
issues. In order to exercise appropriately its soft law regulatory powers, the EBA has to cope with 
some uneasy questions. This is the case, for example, of the questions concerning the scope of EBA’s 
power to issue guidelines and recommendations envisaged by Article 16 of the establishing 
Regulation, the conditions for the exercise of such power and the legal value of the adopted measures. 
Admittedly, some of the issues met by the EBA when acting under Article 16 can be solved in the 
light of the overall functional framework laid down by the EBA establishing Regulation. In particular, 
one may argue that Article 16 envisages two functionally different hypotheses of the exercise of soft 
law powers by the EBA: guidelines and recommendations may be used both within the context of 
supervision - «with a view to establishing consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices 
within the ESFS», Article 16(1) - and within the context of regulation - «to ensuring the common, 
uniform and consistent application of Union law», Article 16(1). Only in this second case, though, are 
                                                     
23 See e.g. Recital 26, Article 8 and Article 16(1) of Regulation 1093/2010, cit. 
24 The role granted to the EBA corresponds to that of the other ESAs. For an analysis of the case of ESMA, see Marloes van 
Rijsbergen, ‘On the enforceability of EU soft law at the national level: The case of the European Securities and Markets 
Authority’ (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 116. 
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they functionally regulatory tools, as they are meant to complete and develop the regulatory process in 
the field
25
. The EBA is therefore to clarify, when making recourse to that provision, whether it is 
relying on guidelines and recommendations either as supervisory instruments or as regulatory 
instruments. In the second case, it may rely on Article 16 as a general enabling provision for the 
adoption of recommendations and guidelines. This stems from the recognition by the EU legislator of 
the crucial relevance of interpretation and application for the construction of an effective regulatory 
environment. The EBA, however, is called to explain why their use is functional «to ensuring the 
common, uniform and consistent application of EU law». This does not necessarily imply that the 
relevant soft law measure should aim at supporting the interpretation and application of a specific EU 
binding regulatory measure. The EBA may issue recommendations and guidelines in segments of the 
single financial market not yet subject to fully developed EU legislation
26
. What the EBA has to 
indicate, though, is the existence of a real or potential problem of interpretation and application of EU 
law which justifies recourse to recommendations and guidelines under Article 16(1). Once such 
justification is provided, the EBA should be considered free to determine the contents of 
recommendations and guidelines, without accepting any indication either from the Commission or 
from national authorities. The EBA is also free in the choice of the formal structure of the measure, 
whether recommendation or guideline. The difference between the two measures seems to be 
irrelevant as of yet, as it basically concerns only the way in which the EBA orientation is formulated: 
as a formalized point of view of the EBA in the case of guidelines; as a more direct invitation to take a 
certain behaviour in the case of recommendations. 
Pointing to the regulatory role of the EBA laid down by the establishing Regulation, however, does 
not address all the issues at stake. The most complex group of issues is related to the legal value of 
guidelines and recommendations with respect to national authorities. As non-binding regulatory 
measures, guidelines and recommendations do not compel national authorities to follow them. In case 
of non-compliance, the EBA cannot apply the mechanism envisaged by Article 17 of the establishing 
Regulation. Nor can the Commission launch an infringement procedure. National authorities, 
moreover, should be considered free to change their orientation after acceptance
27
. However, the 
circumstance that guidelines and recommendations are legally non-binding does not mean that they do 
not produce any effect at all on national authorities. Under Article 16(3), the competent authorities are 
obliged to «make every effort to comply with those guidelines and recommendations». The way in 
which this provision is to be interpreted, though, is far from clear. Indeed, two different and potentially 
conflicting dimensions co-exist in the procedure laid down by Article 16(3): one is oriented towards 
compliance; the other is dialogical and argumentative. The compliance dimension is legally 
ambiguous. Article 16 lays down an obligation to «make every effort to comply with those guidelines 
and recommendations». Yet, this obligation does not open the way to the use of coercive means. 
Rather, it may be interpreted as a duty of loyal cooperation, which is translated in the specific duties to 
make an explicit choice and to give reasons, hypothetically sanctionable through the procedure 
envisaged by Article 17, and which does not limit the ultimate freedom of national authorities to 
choose whether or not to comply with EBA’s recommendations and guidelines. As for the dialogical 
                                                     
25 For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps appropriate to incidentally observe that the functional distinction between supervisory 
and regulatory soft law measures is  also relevant beyond Article 16: for example, the European Supervisory Handbook 
envisaged by Article 29/2 as amended by Regulation 1022/2013, in OJ 2013 L 287, should be considered as a soft law 
measure functionally oriented to supervision, rather than to regulation, and even of little usefulness, provided that it 
should grow up as a simple collection of best practices.  
26 This interpretation is supported by the text of Article 9(2) of Regulation 1093/2010, cit. 
27 See on this point the Decision of the Board of Appeal of the European Supervisory Authorities given under Article 60 
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 and the Board of Appeal’s Rules of Procedure (BoA 2012  002), Appeal by SV Capital 
OÜ against European Banking Authority. § 56 of the Decision states that «even on the basis that the EBA Guidelines are 
not legally binding, they address the matter from a practical perspective, and assist in the interpretation of the scope of 
the provisions of Directive 2006/48/EC». Such a statement, though, is too under-elaborated to suggest a different 
interpretation of the legal consequences of compliance by a national authority. 
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dimension, it is under-developed. It relies on the exchange of arguments between the competent 
national authorities and the EBA. Such exchange, though, is not well designed. For example, the EBA 
may publish the fact that the national authority does not comply, but is not obliged to publish the 
reasons. Moreover, the EBA has no duty to state its own reasons. 
The tension between the recognition of EBA’s functional prominence and the limitation of its powers, 
therefore, raises several operational issues, which prevent the smooth functioning of the network and 
make the relations between the EBA and national authorities substantially unstable. At the same time, 
however, the current situation also offers an opportunity to clarify the limits of the functional 
prominence that the EBA might be granted within the network.  
As for the powers that may be conferred on the EBA, we have already observed that European 
agencies and other EU specialized administrations can be lawfully granted discretionary powers under 
the existing constitutional framework, provided that the role of the Commission is effectively 
guaranteed when it is so required by the Treaty and provided that the administrative discretionary 
powers are framed by a previous EU legislative act in such a way as to preclude an arbitrary exercise 
of power by the relevant EU body
28
. There are no legal reasons, in our opinion, to exclude that the 
EBA is granted fully binding powers in order to manage the interpretation and application of the 
relevant EU law provisions by national authorities.  
Leaving aside the issue of the EBA powers, though, one might doubt that the EBA’s functional 
prominence within the financial services administrative network is compatible with the existing EU 
constitutional framework for the implementation of EU laws and policies. In particular, it might be 
argued that the introduction by the Lisbon Treaty of a new EU competence of support and 
coordination in the field of administrative co-operation implies the re-affirmation of the principle of 
indirect execution, through national administrations only, as the general pattern of administrative 
implementation of EU laws and policies. The establishment of any instrument of administrative co-
operation between national administrations would be possible only within the strict boundaries of the 
new competence envisaged by Article 197 TFEU
29
, which in any case does not allow for the setting up 
of a transnational network functionally dominated by an EU body.  
From a legal realist perspective, however, one should recognize that granting the EBA a position of 
genuine functional prominence would be not only functionally justified, but also legally possible. 
While the Lisbon Treaty may be based on a preference for indirect administrative execution, the new 
competence in the field of administrative co-operation does not have the effect of overthrowing the 
regulatory technique which has been used so far by the EU legislator to establish mechanisms of joint 
implementation of EU law and has been upheld by the Court of Justice
30
. We are referring to the 
                                                     
28 Supra, § 2. 
29 The substance and boundaries of the EU intervention are sketched in Article 197 TFEU. It is provided that the possible 
interventions may include facilitating the exchange of information and of civil servants as well as supporting training 
schemes. Moreover, it has been clarified that the EU measures in this area will be regulations adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. In addition to this, the limits of 
the EU intervention are specified: it excludes any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States, and 
no Member State is obliged to avail itself of the EU support. 
30  See Case C-217/04, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union [2006] ECR I-3771, in particular at §§ 44-45, and Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, nyr, § 41 ff. In the first case, concerning 
the ENISA, the United Kingdom argued that the legal basis of the establishing Regulation had been erroneously 
identified in Art 95 instead of Art 308 of the EC Treaty. The Court of Justice, though, held that the EU legislator may 
deem it «necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body responsible for contributing to the 
implementation of a process of harmonisation in situations where, in order to facilitate the uniform implementation and 
application of acts based on that provision, the adoption of non-binding supporting and framework measures seems 
appropriate»; the tasks conferred on such a body, however, «must be closely linked to the subject-matter of the acts 
approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States». In the second case, concerning 
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adoption of measures of harmonization in certain sectors envisaging, together with the harmonization 
of substantial rules, also instruments of co-operation among national administrations and among the 
latter and the EU authorities. In this context, the most reasonable interpretative option is to consider 
Article 197 as a legal basis adding to the legal bases already existing and usefully exploited by the EU 
political institutions to establish and deepen administrative co-operation between national and EU 
administrations. The legal bases already existing are provisions laying down material competences and 
relate to specific fields of action. The legal basis provided by Article 197, instead, has an institutional 
content and it is not linked to a specific sector. It thus provides further options to the EU political 
institutions.  
A reform of the administrative architecture of the financial services single market, therefore, could 
lawfully reinforce EBA’s functional prominence vis-à-vis its national partners. On a more general 
level, such development would even be in line with the deep rationale of the new provisions, based on 
the recognition of the importance of co-ordination of national administrations for the maturation of the 
EU. The decisive elements are, on the one side, the formalization of the effectiveness of the 
implementation of EU law by the Member States as a «matter of common interest», on the other, the 
acknowledgement that compliance by the addressees of EU law cannot be simply controlled through 
the traditional coercive means of infringement proceedings and judicial control, but it needs to be 
gradually built through instruments of administrative co-operation managed at the European level. 
Accountability 
Accountability has been part of EU administrative law since long before the financial and public debt 
crisis. The gradual emergence of an EU administrative system has been accompanied by the provision 
of a number of ever more incisive mechanisms of control, such as, for example, judicial review, the 
administrative rule of law
31
, institutional control carried out by EU institutions, and horizontal control 
taking place within the transnational networks coordinated by EU bodies. Some of these control 
mechanisms may be reconstructed as accountability tools, that is as legal and institutional 
arrangements whose function is to force EU administrations to explain and justify their conduct, both 




(Contd.)                                                                  
ESMA, the United Kingdom argued that Article 114 TFEU does not empower the EU legislator to take individual 
decisions that are not of general application or to delegate to the Commission or a Union agency the power to adopt such 
decisions. The Court of Justice, though, rejected this plea by holding that Art 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 satisfies all 
the requirements laid down in Article 114 TFEU, which therefore constitutes an appropriate legal basis for the adoption 
of Art 28. Indeed, the TFEU confers the EU legislature discretion as regards the most appropriate method of 
harmonization for achieving the desired result, including the establishment of an EU body responsible for contributing to 
the implementation of a process of harmonization. That is the case in particular where the measures to be adopted are 
dependent on specific professional and technical expertise and the ability of such a body to respond swiftly and 
appropriately (§ 100-117). 
31 Which is broadly meant here as the set of procedural rights and duties in administrative proceedings before EU 
administrations. On the principle of the rule of law in the EU legal order see Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the 
Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1625; Loïc Azoulaї 
and Laure Clément-Wilz, ‘Le principe de légalité', in Jean.-Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère (Eds.), 
Droit administratif européen (Bruxelles: Bruylant, II ed., 2014) 543; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutional Principles’, in 
Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (Eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, cit., 3; Laurent Pech, The Rule 
of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union (Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/09, NYU School of Law), 
online at www.JeanMonnetProgram.org; and Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis, ‘Systemic deficiency in the 
rule of law: What it is, what has been done, what can be done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59, 62. 
32 The notion of accountability which is here used partly differs from that adopted in other studies on the EU administrations; 
see, for example, Carol Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 53 and 
182; Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multi-Level Governance: A Network Approach’ 
(2007) 13 European Law Journal 542; Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices, and the 
Living Constitution, cit., 246; Mark Bovens, Deirdre Curtin and Paul Hart (Eds.), The Real World of EU Accountability. 
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While certainly confirming the EU orientation towards accountability, the developments connected to 
the European responses to the crisis bring about a qualitative change. In order to tackle the crisis, the 
EU has not simply established control instruments that may be conceptualized, through an ex post 
reconstructive exercise, as accountability arrangements. It has openly recognized the relevance and 
centrality of accountability instruments to the proper functioning of the EU administrative system. 
This shows a new political and legal sensitivity, combining the administrative with the constitutional 
in the reform of the EU administrative capacities.  
At the same time, the new arrangements do not seem capable of making the EU administrations really 
accountable. In laying down accountability mechanisms, the various EU actors have been driven by 
pragmatism and pluralism. The result is an approach searching to adapt the accountability regimes to 
the specificities of the various types of new administrations. Yet, the existing instruments are not 
designed as complementary elements of wider «accountability regimes», that is as components of sets 
of principles, rules and practices coherently organized in such a way to ensure the accountability of 
EU administrations
33
. Moreover, the accountability instruments do not exploit the multiple 
possibilities offered by the structural and functional features of the relevant administrations. 
This is a further tension underlying the process of reorganization and growth of the EU administrative 
machinery within the single financial market and the EMU: on the one hand, for the first time in its 
administrative history, the EU explicitly points to the need to ensure the accountability of its 
administrative machinery; on the other hand, it envisages a number of arrangements which are not 
always capable of achieving that objective.  
Such tension has somehow ambivalent effects. The attempt to enhance administrative accountability 
through imperfect instruments does not give rise to legal and operational issues. Nor does it determine 
a loss of coherence and unity in the EU administrative system. Rather, it limits the capacity of the 
accountability instruments to operate as a source of legitimation of the EU administrative system. In 
liberal-democratic orders, based upon the values of democracy and the rule of law, the instruments of 
administrative accountability are not simply oriented to ensure that administrative action is kept under 
control. At a more profound level, they contribute to the legitimation of the administrative system by 
promoting and strengthening the rule of law and the principle of democracy within the administrative 
machinery (for example, when accountability relies upon instruments of the administrative rule of law 
or implies oversight by democratic political institutions). The imperfections of the current 
accountability arrangements, of course, do not make the EU administrative system less legitimate. Yet, 
they hinder the capacity of the accountability instruments to operate as one of the sources of 
legitimation for the EU administrative system. Such shortcoming is partly compensated by the 
circumstance that the current situation provides an opportunity for opening an institutional and 
scientific discussion on the relevance and articulation of administrative accountability within the EU. 
The SSM offers an example of the tension between the new sensitivity towards accountability and the 
difficulties met by the EU actors when attempting to lay down accountability arrangements. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
What Deficit? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); E. Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies, Law and Practices of 
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); E. Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer, ‘The Theory and 
Practice of EU Agency Autonomy and Accountability: Early Day Expectations, Today’s Realities and Future 
Perspectives’, in Michelle Everson, Cosimo Monda and Ellen Vos (Eds.), European Agencies in between Institutions and 
Member States (AH Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2014) 175. As in those studies, accountability is here meant 
as a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has the obligation to explain and justify his conduct, 
the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and their actor might face consequences. Accountability, however, is 
not conceived as a purely retrospective exercise, but extended to cover both the making and the outcome of 
administrative action.  
33 On the notion of accountability regime see in particular Jerry L. Mashaw, ‘Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: 
Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law’ (2005) Issues in Legal Scholarship (2005), online at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4/ (last visited 20 January 2015). 
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One should first of all recognize that the SSM’s regulation encapsulates a genuine effort of the EU 
legislator to establish effective accountability arrangements. What is remarkable, in particular, is the 
choice to treat accountability as an issue deserving autonomous consideration within the regulation
34
. 
Moreover, accountability is developed through a number of inter-related instruments, each working in 
combination with the others. First, the regulation provides for a number of accountability requirements 
towards the European Parliament and the Council «as democratically legitimised institutions» 
representing the citizens of the Union and the Member States
35
. Democratic accountability over the 
ECB mainly consists in reporting and responding obligations and it is justified insofar as the ECB acts 
as a banking supervisor. Second, the accountability framework of the SSM pragmatically takes into 
account the limited jurisdiction of the SSM. For the conduct of its supervisory tasks, the ECB is made 
accountable not only to the European Parliament and the Council. It also reports to the Eurogroup, 
implicitly acknowledged as a leading political body within the Eurozone jurisdiction
36
. Third, the ECB 
is called to account to the parliaments of the participating Member States. This is motivated by the fact 
that «the supervisory tasks of the SSM may have a bearing on fiscal responsibilities of Member States, 
notably in the case of a bank failure or financial crisis»
37
. Fourth, the accountability framework of the 
SSM exploits the accountability arrangements provided for under national law, which continue to 
apply to the national competent authorities taking action under the regulation. 
The effort of the EU legislator to structure and organize the SSM accountability suggests that a new 
political and legal culture is in the process of emerging. This should not hide, though, the fact that the 
choices made by the EU legislator are not really capable of reaching the effect which is sought. One 
aspect is that accountability is essentially constructed as a compensation for the loss of national 
powers, rather than as a necessary feature of the functioning of the administrative machinery of a 
liberal-democratic polity. The preamble of the regulation, for example, states that «[a]ny shift of 
supervisory powers from the Member State to the Union level should be balanced by appropriate 
transparency and accountability requirements»
38
. This perspective is of course understandable within 
the context of the political discourse concerning the expansion of EU competences and the parallel 
reduction of the Member States’ scope of action. But it reduces the rationale of accountability to one 
single functional reason, that of the balance between national and supranational powers, ignoring other 
possible functional reasons, as well as the possibility of providing accountability with normative 
foundations. In addition to this, although designed as complementary elements, the various SSM 
accountability instruments do not combine in a fully coherent «accountability regime». The SSM 
regulation promotes accountability, but it does not address in a single framework all the main issues 
involved in the accountability practice (who, to whom, about what, through what processes, by what 
standards and with what effects). What it does, instead, is to identify some technical solutions that are 
potentially capable of making the ECB more responsive when exercising its banking supervisory 
powers. In identifying those technical solutions, moreover, the SSM regulation makes a number of 
quite conventional choices. While such choices certainly go in the direction of accountability, they 
could have been complemented and enriched by more creative arrangements, exploiting the multiple 
possibilities offered by the structural and functional features of the SSM, starting with the use of 
techniques of intra-institutional and horizontal accountability. Finally, the relevance of the instruments 
of institutional accountability is seriously undermined by the fact that the consequences of a negative 
assessment by the competent EU institutions are mainly limited to political censure.  
                                                     
34 See Article 20 of Regulation 1024/2013, cit. 
35 Ibidem, whereas 55. 
36 Ibidem, Article 20/3, which clarifies that the Eurogroup shall meet in the presence of representatives from any Member 
State whose currency is not the euro and which is in close cooperation with the SSM. 
37 Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, ‘Europeanising prudential banking supervision. Legal foundations and implications for European 
integration’, cit., 576.  
38 Regulation 1024/2013, cit., whereas 55. 
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The imperfections of the SSM accountability framework have at least one major shortcoming. They 
limit the capacity of such a framework to fulfil the potential of accountability. Accountability is here 
designed as a technique of control over administrative action. It cannot serve to legitimise the new EU 
administrative capacities. The various accountability instruments, indeed, are not directly linked to the 
principle of democracy and the rule of law, on which the EU is founded. They do not encapsulate any 
clearly identifiable normative values, but only reflect the functional need to compensate the shift of 
competences from the Member States to the EU. They are not coordinated one with the other in a 
single accountability regime, explicitly oriented to supplement the legitimation provided to the SSM 
by the establishing legislation. 
The tension between the ambition to enhance administrative accountability and the difficulties to lay 
down proper accountability arrangements, in any case, does not necessarily lead to an impasse. It 
might also open the way to an institutional and scientific reflection on the function, scope and content 
of administrative accountability within the EU. Such a reflection should not address positive law 
issues. It should rather address issues of institutional design. Are accountability regimes a necessary 
element of a mature EU administrative system? If so, how could they be articulated? What rationale 
should underlie their development? Which normative values and functional exigencies should they 
promote and address? 
This paper cannot enter in such discussion. It claims, though, that these are inescapable questions. The 
attempt to move towards administrative accountability without clarifying its rationale and orientation, 
both normative and functional, may facilitate, to a certain extent, the consolidation of accountability 
practices. But it is too narrow a project, minimizing the possible relevance of accountability within the 
EU administrative system. The challenge is to be more ambitious and to put at the heart of EU 
administrative law a project of institutional design, oriented to the establishment of accountability 
regimes, deploying in a creative way multiple modalities of accountability, such as, for example, the 
traditional instruments of procedural and judicial accountability, the mechanisms of political 
accountability and the emerging tools of horizontal or inter-institutional accountability, which may be 
valuable in an administrative system based on administrative networks by sector. As Jerry Mashaw 
has recently observed, «every exercise in devising appropriate accountability systems is […] an 
exercise in comparative incompetence». But this is a project that the administrative law of a polity 
oriented towards democratic constitutionalism cannot fail to carry out. 
Conclusions 
The European responses to the financial and public debt crisis have triggered a process of 
administrative reorganization and growth within two fundamental sectors of the EU, the internal 
market of financial services and the EMU. This paper has not discussed such a process through an 
analysis of the single administrative changes introduced by the EU actors. Rather, it has tried to reflect 
on its overall features, by asking on which dynamic the process of administrative change is based, in 
what direction it is leading the EU administrative system and its law, and how it can be assessed. 
Admittedly, the inquiry which has been carried out represents only a preliminary step in a complex 
field of research. Indeed, it has been based on a bird’s-eye view of the process of administrative 
reorganization and growth. Moreover, it might be deepened and broadened by taking into 
consideration further aspects of the overall picture, such as, for example, the transformation of the 
purposes of EU administrative action. Despite these shortcomings, the inquiry seems useful in so far 
as it highlights a number of elements that should be taken into consideration in a general 
reconstruction of the ongoing process of administrative change in the EU. 
The main conclusions may be summarized as follows. First, the underlying dynamic of the process is 
one of policy learning, rather than of administrative reform. The explosion of the financial and public 
debt crisis has not prompted the elaboration of a coherent and unitary administrative strategy, based 
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upon consistent principles and oriented to the achievement of clearly identified objectives. Instead, the 
lessons learned from the experience of the crisis have triggered a non-linearly progressing sequence, 
responding to the logic of a slow and gradual improvement of the administrative capacities of the 
internal market of financial services and the EMU. 
Second, while confined to two specific EU sectors, the process of administrative reorganization and 
growth is potentially relevant beyond the internal market of financial sectors and the EMU. Indeed, it 
raises issues that characterize also other fields of EU administrative action. Moreover, it might 
influence the administrative developments in other sectors, operating as a term for comparison and as 
a source of inspiration. 
Third, at its current state of development, the process of administrative change does not drive the EU 
administrative system into a precise direction. The EU actors have made a number of choices that do 
not reflect a clear orientation, but tensions between opposite forces. They have both reinforced the 
powers of EU satellite administrations and obstructed their effective exercise. They have at the same 
time refined the administrative capacities of the EU as whole and established administrative 
arrangements for the Eurozone only, thus giving rise to a variable geometry administrative 
architecture. They have both strengthened and limited centralization within the implementing 
mechanisms. While explicitly affirming the need to ensure administrative accountability, they have 
envisaged a number of arrangements which seem incapable of reaching that objective. These tensions 
may be connected to several factors, such as the constraints of the current EU constitutional 
framework and the institutional culture of the EU. Yet, they are mainly due to the divergences between 
the political preferences of the Member States in organizing the EU responses to the crisis. 
Finally, and most importantly, the process of administrative change is highly ambivalent. The 
developments of the last five years have been assessed in the light of their capability to improve the 
EU administrative capacities of the internal market of financial services and the EMU, which was the 
objective sought by the EU actors. Considered in this perspective, the tensions inherent in the choices 
made by the EU actors operate as partly negative and partly positive forces. On the one side, the four 
tensions might destabilize the functioning of the EU administrations operating in the two fields subject 
to administrative change. As the analysis has shown, they give rise to positive law issues which 
undermine the working capacity of the EU administrations. They challenge the internal coherence of 
the EU administrative system. They might undermine the capacity of the implementing mechanisms to 
ensure the full effectiveness of EU laws and policies. They prevent the new administrative capacities 
from operating as a source of legitimation of the EU administrative system. On the other hand, the 
tensions highlighted in this paper provide an occasion to open an institutional and scientific discussion 
on the powers that can be provided to the EU satellite administrations, on the appropriate balance 
between unity and differentiation in the EU administrative system, on the legal possibility to reinforce 
centralization and hierarchy within the administrative networks, and on the function and relevance of 
administrative accountability. It would therefore be misleading to represent the process of 
administrative growth and reorganization as a process oriented towards the improvement of the 
administrative capacities of the EU in two key sectors of its action, as it is assumed by the EU actors. 
Indeed, the tensions inherent in the process may at the same time work as «fault lines» of the EU 
administrative machinery and offer a chance to make clear choices on a number of important issues.  
Some of the possible solutions to the issues at stake have been suggested in the previous pages. 
Others, and in particular those to the issues of institutional design, have been left for further reflection. 
While declining to directly contribute to such reflection, we point to the fact that any discussion on 
possible administrative changes within the EU should start by recognizing the relevance and 
ambivalence of the administrative developments of the last five years. This is a crucial moment for the 
EU administrative system, which might either face a process of gradual decline or clarify its structural 
and functional features, as well as its overall position within the EU legal order. 
  
 
